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The practice of history in law is a time honored tradition in American
jurisprudence. Since the Constitution’s inception, lawyers and jurists have relied on
history, in one form or another, to adjudicate constitutional questions and
controversies.1 It is a practice that has been categorized under many subheadings, to
include historicism, intentionalism, interpretivist history, and historical narrative.2
Today the practice has become more popular than ever with the rise of originalism, a
form of constitutional interpretation and construction that views the Constitution’s
text as a past to be preserved for use in the present.3 Originalism means different
things to different people. For some, originalism is about resurrecting the intentions
of the delegates who drafted and framed the Constitution or what is otherwise
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referred to as original intent.4 For others, originalism is about how the Constitution’s
text and provisions were understood by the generation that adopted it or what has
been referred to as the new originalism.5 Then there are originalists that believe the
only way to be faithful to the Constitution, and its prescription for a republican form
of government, is to apply the interpretive rules of those who adopted it or what is
referred to as original methods originalism.6 To restate this last premise more
succinctly, original methods originalism requires interpreting a 1787 constitutional
provision according to late eighteenth-century rules, interpreting a 1868
constitutional provision according to mid to late nineteenth-century rules, and so
forth. There are indeed variations and nuances to these and other originalist
methodologies,7 but whatever variety of originalism is applied, the overarching
premise is similar given that originalists advocate the Constitution should be
interpreted according to a set of fixed and unalterable principles.8 This in turn limits
judicial activism and allows the constitutional amendment process to fix any
undesirable results.9
Originalists sometimes claim originalism has always existed in one form or
another since the Constitution’s ratification,10 but there is no substantiated evidence,
4

See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
143-60 (Free Press 1997).

THE LAW
5

See, e.g., Keith Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609
(2004).
6

See JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION (Harvard University Press 2013); John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport,
Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 751 (2009); John O. McGinnis and Michael
Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
371, 372 (2007).
7

See James E. Fleming, Living Originalism and Living Constitutionalism as Moral
Readings of the American Constitution, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1174 (2012). See also Thomas
B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 244 (2009) (“A review of
originalists’ work reveals originalism to be not a single, coherent, unified theory of
constitutional interpretation, but rather a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories that
share little in common except a misleading reliance on a single label.”).
8

Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411,
412 (2013) (“Originalism stands for the proposition that the meaning of a written constitution
should remain the same until it is properly changed.”); Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A
Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 377-78 (2013) (stating originalists agree that
the text “historically fixed” is at the heart of originalism); MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT,
ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 117 (“Originalist theories argue
that the actual meaning of the Constitution is fixed as of the time of its enactment.”).
9
For a more in depth discussion, see LAWRENCE B. SOLUM & ROBERT W. BENNETT,
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1-35, 84-119 (Cornell University Press 2011). See
also Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of Constitutional
Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147, 156 (2012) (“The fixation thesis and the constraint principle
constitute the core of contemporary originalist thought.”).
10

See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 79 (West 2012); see also MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 126-33; Lee J. Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of
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at least in total historical context, to support it.11 The truth of the matter is
originalism is a revival, or one might argue evolution, of a late nineteenth-century
and early twentieth-century debate over constitutional interpretation that centered on
whether history can pinpoint a set of fixed and unalterable principles to interpret the
Constitution.12 It was a debate historians dismissed given the complexities of
importing the past for use in the present, and the wide acceptance of the common
law approach to constitutional interpretation.13 Historian Charles A. Beard, for one,
dismissed the view of lawyers and laymen that asserted the “provisions of the
Constitution are clear and fixed—like or similar to the multiplication table or natural
science.”14 While Beard expressed “no doubt” that a number of constitutional
provisions were intended to be rigid, he maintained reservations concerning the
Constitution’s “broad and general” clauses such as “due process of law, life, liberty
and property, commerce among the states, general welfare, and privileges and
immunities.”15 Beard was also concerned with the dilemma of multiple meanings.
There would always be instances where jurists must choose between competing
interpretations. It was primarily for this reason that Beard felt characterizing the
Constitution as “changeless” to be without substance.16
Prominent English jurist and historian Sir Frederick Pollock was another early
voice to dismiss the notion that the Constitution was intended to be changeless.
According to Pollock, history showed how it was not unusual for new generations of
lawyers to regard the system they are trained in as “a monster of inhuman
perfection.”17 Pollock was particularly defensive when lawyers asserted the need to
cast out the common law approach to constitutional interpretation, where precedent
and reason dictated the results. In Pollock’s mind, to cast out the common law
Independence, and the Constitution: A Unique Role in Constitutional Interpretation?, 111
PENN ST. L. REV. 413, 438-39, 447 (2006).
11

See generally JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING
CONSTITUTION (Alfred A. Knopf 1996). See also Lorianne Updike Toler, J. Carl
Cecere, & Justice Don Willett, Pre-“Originalism,” 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 277, 304
(2012) (showing originalist methodologies were not employed following the ratification of the
Constitution); Sister Marie Carolyn Klinkhamer, The Use of History in the Supreme Court,
1789-1835, 36 U. DET. L.J. 553 (1959) (showing the early Justices of the Supreme Court used
history to explain the path of the law); Sister Marie Carolyn Klinkhamer, John Marshall’s Use
of History, 6 CATH. U. L. REV. 78, 88-95 (1956) (showing how John Marshall used history
sparingly and did not employ it as an outcome determinative tool).

OF THE

12

CHARLES, supra note 1, at 7.

13

See, e.g., Julius Goebel, Jr., Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLUM.
L. REV. 555 (1938).
14
Charles A. Beard, The Act of Constitutional Interpretation, 1 NAT’L LAW. GUILD Q. 9,
12 (1937).
15

Id. at 13.

16

Id. at 14. For more on the view that Charles A. Beard dismissed originalism before it
ever came to fruition, see R.B. Bernstein, Charles A. Beard: Foe of Originalism, 2 AM. POL.
THOUGHT 302 (2013); Adrian Vermeule, Beard and Holmes on Constitutional Adjudication,
CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2014).
17

Frederick Pollock, The Genius of the Common Law I: Our Lady and Her Knights, 12
COLUM. L. REV. 189, 189 (1912).
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approach was rooted in arrogance. “But the dogmatic assertion that law is the
perfection of reason belongs to a later age,” wrote Pollock, “an age of antiquarian
reverence often falling into superstition and of technical learning often corrupted by
pedantry.”18
This is not to say Beard, Pollock, and later historians dismissed the use of history
in law outright. It was quite the opposite. Historians understood that history was a
valuable and irresistible tool from which to legally reason.19 The reservation
historians maintained with the practice was history of the “law office” variety—the
selection and manipulation of historical data favorable to a predisposed legal
position—for by quoting and selecting history the courts made history.20 Therefore,
historians proposed that the legal academy seek a more sophisticated and restrained
approach.21 What this entailed was employing the evidentiary record in historical
context, but only in a minority of cases, thus preventing the use and abuse of history
to advance judicial philosophies.22
In the years that followed, the Supreme Court somewhat adhered to the historical
academy’s call for a more restrained approach to history in law,23 however, in the
minority of cases where history was used, the legal academy made little, if any,
improvement of its employment of historical methodologies, especially limiting
history of the law office variety.24 It was in the midst of this practice that original
intent originalism thrust itself into the debate over constitutional interpretation.
Whether originalists forgot or just ignored the preceding debates over history in
law,25 original intent proponents claimed the history of those who drafted and framed
the Constitution’s text was the key to unlocking the correct interpretation of
constitutional provisions. In response, historians and legal critics showed the
difficulties in pinpointing the collective intentions of those who drafted and
approved the Constitution.26 By the time historians and legal critics had exposed
18

Id. at 190.

19

See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL
NEW YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664-1776) xxxiii-xxxiv (Patterson Smith
1944); Murphy, supra note 2, at 72-79.
20

Kelly, supra note 2, at 122.

21

Id. at 157.

22

Id. at 158.

23

See, e.g., Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., History and Law, U. CHI. L. REV. 237, 239 (1959).

24

For some discussions, see Buckner F. Melton, Clio at the Bar: A Guide to Historical
Method for Legists and Jurists, 83 MINN. L. REV. 377, 434 (1998); Neil M. Richards, Clio and
the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court’s Uses of History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809, 818
(1997); CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (Harvard
University Press 1969).
25

Even before originalism came to the forefront in the late 1970s, such a methodology of
interpreting the Constitution was sufficiently challenged. See, e.g., John G. Wofford, The
Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502
(1964).
26

There are numerous criticisms of original intent, but for some of the more prominent,
see Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of
Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 351-52 (1989); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL
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original intent as the pathetic fallacy27 it was, however, originalist proponents had
refocused their approach by centering on the original meaning or original
understanding of the Constitution’s text. Known as the “new originalism,” the
interpretational approach was born from the understanding that the Constitution was
ratified by consent of “the people,” and could not solely revolve around what the
drafters and framers thought at the 1787 Constitutional Convention.28 Instead, the
historical net needed to be cast wider to include how the public understood the
Constitution at the point in time the provision was drafted, debated, and ratified. To
be clear, what mattered most was the linguistic usage of constitutional text among
those who wrote and ratified the text, as well as the general public to whom the
Constitution addressed.29 But here too what new originalists have claimed as an
objective approach to decoding the Constitution has proven to be another false idol.30
Perhaps the greatest objectivity issue with new originalism remains that its
textually-oriented methodologies do little to prevent subjective outcomes,31
particularly given that a number of originalists perform the task of recreating a
hypothetical reasonable person that lived during the period a respective
constitutional provision was drafted, debated or ratified.32 This is objectively
problematic on a number of levels. First and foremost, as constitutional historian
Saul Cornell has pointed out, the varieties of legal interpretation that can be found in
any historical era are numerous.33 Certainly not every interpretation can be

INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION (Macmillan Publishers 1988); H. Jefferson Powell,
Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
27

I have borrowed this characterization to describe originalism from the late English
historian Herbert Butterfield, who used the term to describe Whiggish history. In my opinion,
originalism and Whiggish history suffer from similar defects. See HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE
WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 20 (1931).
28
This approach to constitutional interpretation is often credited to or draws from the
writings of James Madison. See RAKOVE, supra note 11, at 17-18, 352-53, 362-64; LEVY,
supra note 26, at 5, 20-29.
29

See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service
in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237, 239-40 (2004).
30
See, e.g., Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. the Lawyer’s Constitution:
Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate Over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 295 (2011).
31

See Eric Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 329, 331, 345-65
(2013); Jack Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, The Poverty of Public
Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO. L. REV. 575, 578 (2011) (“Whether originalism does
more to constrain than liberate would be hard to measure.”).
32
See, e.g., Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem:
Originalism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551, 1559 (2012); see also
Barnett, supra note 8, at 413-15.
33

See Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 626-31 (2008); see also Larry Kramer, Two (More)
Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907 (2008); Caleb Nelson,
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (2003).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014

5

28

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:23

categorized as reasonable or dominant.34 The hypothetical reasonable person
construct also fails because this historical reader is unidentifiable, for this imaginary
person is constructed in the visionary mind of the respective originalist.35
Essentially, what it boils down to is new originalism’s hypothetical reasonable
person construct raises the dilemma of subjective outcomes. It is no secret that the
same type of originalist inquiry can lead to competing results, all dependent on the
methodologies employed by the researcher, including the manner and order the
empirical questions are asked and answered.36 From the historian’s perspective, this
often results from a lack of historical consciousness or when the inquirer reads his or
her own predilections from the evidentiary record.37 To borrow from Detroit Mercy
law professor and originalist critic Bret Boyce, it should “not be surprising that
public meaning originalists . . . reach such dramatically divergent conclusions about .
. . proper [constitutional] interpretation and construction,” for when “they peer into
the magic mirror of [constitutional] meaning, originalists tend to see their own
political philosophies and ideological presumptions.”38
Lastly, there is the matter of new originalist outcomes contradicting what a
thorough historical inquiry provides. A notable example is the First Amendment’s
Press Clause. Just recently, UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh claimed an
originalist inquiry confirms the founding generation foresaw the Press Clause as
enshrining a right to print technology, and then suggested there is no substantiated
historical evidence showing that the founding generation interpreted the Press Clause
as guaranteeing any press freedoms.39 Volokh’s originalist conclusion, however, is
deeply problematic given two indisputable historical truths. First and foremost, the
technological vehicle of printing books, pamphlets, and newspapers remained
unchanged from the late seventeenth century through the Early Republic. With only
one publishing technology having been made available up through the late
eighteenth century, it is impossible for Volokh to conclude the founding generation
34

Cornell, supra note 30, at 295-304; see also Gordon Wood, Rhetoric and Reality in the
American Revolution, 23 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1966) (discussing the historian’s dilemma when
separating political propaganda, changing arguments, and political realities).
35

Rakove, supra note 31, at 584-86.

36

The Fourteenth Amendment is a case in point. See generally Bret Boyce, The Magic
Mirror of “Original Meaning”: Recent Approaches to the Fourteenth Amendment, 66 ME. L.
REV. 29 (2013).
37
See J.G.A. POCOCK, POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND
METHOD 3–20, 189 (Cambridge University Press 2009); J.G.A. Pocock, British History: A
Plea for a New Subject, 47 J. MOD. HIST. 601, 614-15 (1975).
38

Boyce, supra note 36, at 36. Brett Boyce is not the first to make this kind of
observation. Following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Henry Reed made a
similar line of argument. See Henry Reed, American Constitution in 1787 and 1866, 2 THE
INT’L REV. 604, 619 (1875).
39

Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a
Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (2011). For a recent
application of Volokh’s thesis to potential Press Clause jurisprudence, see Michael W.
McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 432447 (2013) (arguing that history does not support recognizing any organizational press
freedoms).
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viewed the Press Clause as an evolving technological right of “the people” to employ
free speech. Such a conclusion is nothing more than Volokh imprinting his modern
libertarian values onto the past. Second, Volokh’s originalist claim is undermined by
the evidentiary record that most originalist inquiries seem to overlook, particularly
through a detailed intellectual and ideological historical inquiry. In terms of the Press
Clause, the historical evidence suggests that both the public and printers viewed the
“liberty of the press” as providing some protections to acquire and print information
on matters of public concern.40 This is not to say that every person in the late
eighteenth century perceived the Press Clause in this light, but there is evidence
suggesting that many did.
The constitutional scope of the Press Clause is just one of many examples of
originalist constructs resulting in subjective outcomes. And, of course, originalism,
in any of its forms, is not the only culprit when it comes to substituting one’s
personal beliefs as historical fact. Originalism is merely the most popular means
employed today.41 It seeks to persuade us that the generation who drafted, framed,
debated, and ratified a respective constitutional provision would have agreed with
whatever outcome the originalist proclaims to be true. But again, more often than
not, the results end up replacing facts with myths.42
The practice of recasting constitutional history to conform to one’s own
predilections first grew to prominence in the seventeenth century.43 It was a practice
employed during the Constitution’s ratification in 1789, but became even more
prominent near the turn of the nineteenth century with the rise of the Jeffersonian
Republicans.44 And it is a practice that continues today whenever politicians,
lawyers, jurists, and pundits substitute their personal views as historical fact.
Lawyers regularly perform this task in court pleadings when they ask the judiciary to
accept historical source “X” or “Y” as binding legitimate authority, while, at the
same time, requesting the judiciary to ignore others. The same holds true for jurists
who rely on certain facets of the evidentiary record to support the outcome of case,
all the while denouncing, rejecting or discounting others.45 In either instance, the
40

For a full discussion on the history of the “liberty of the press,” see Patrick J. Charles &
Kevin F. O’Neill, Saving the Press Clause from Ruin: The Customary Origins of a “Free
Press” as Interface to the Present and Future, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1691 (2012).
41
Originalism in many ways has become intertwined with popular constitutionalism. For
some discussions, see Rebecca E. Zietlow, Popular Originalism?: The Tea Party Movement
and Constitutional Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 483 (2012); Todd E. Pettys, Popular
Constitutionalism and Relaxing the Dead Hand: Can the People Be Trusted?, 86 WASH. U. L.
REV. 313 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008); see also Eric A. Posner, Why Originalism Is So
Popular, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 14, 2011, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/81480/
republicans-constitution-originalism-popular.
42
See, e.g., RAY RAPHAEL, CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHS: WHAT WE GET WRONG AND HOW TO
GET IT RIGHT (New Press 2013).
43
J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF
ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (Cambridge University Press
1957).
44

Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, supra note 26, at 924-35.

45

Wiecek, supra note 2, at 227-28.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014

7

30

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:23

result is the acceptance of historical myth in lieu of historical fact. The question
moving forward, and what this article seeks to answer, is when, if ever, is the use of
myth a constitutionally legitimate enterprise.
Given that the act of modifying the dead hand of the past to meet the desires of
the present has been practiced for centuries, it may be argued that substituting
historical myth for fact is already a constitutionally legitimate enterprise. There are
two problems, however, with this statement. First, jurists who have practiced or
currently practice history in law, no matter the respective case or controversy, do not
openly admit to modifying the past for use in the present. To do so would reveal
their subjective leanings and ultimately call into question the legitimacy of their
analysis. Second, even though a respective jurist may, in fact, have advanced false
notions of history—at the time the jurist wrote or joined the opinion—the jurist
generally believes he or she is being a good steward of the past. Otherwise, he or she
would not have written or joined the opinion in the first place.46
Still, one may assert that modifying the past to adjudicate constitutional
questions and controversies is in line with the practice of living and popular
constitutionalism, i.e. interpreting the Constitution in line with the beliefs, views,
and needs of the present. This is a valid response if, and only if, constitutional
interpretation is limited to notions of living and popular constitutionalism, and it is
acknowledged that the past is nothing more than a subcontractor for use in the
present. American constitutional jurisprudence, however, has never been solely
based on the doctrines of living and popular constitutionalism.47 As it stands today,
there are indeed a number of opinions, holdings, and legal precedents that reflect
notions of living and popular constitutionalism, but there are an equal number of
opinions, holdings, and legal tests that emphasize the importance of history, custom,
and tradition.48
It is in these latter instances that the use of historical myth in lieu of historical
fact is facially illegitimate. If one pauses to consider, it is impossible to proclaim that
any historically based argument is legitimate if it contradicts what a thorough
examination of the evidentiary record provides.49 It is the equivalent of a court
46

For some useful discussions on history in law by jurists, see Amanda L. Taylor et al., A
Dialogue with Federal Judges on the Role of History in Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1889 (2012); Jeffrey S. Sutton, The Role of History in Judging Disputes About the
Meaning of the Constitution, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1173 (2009); Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith
and Credit: The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1945).
47
See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 29 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 401 (2006); DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (Oxford University Press
2010).
48

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning the First and Seventh Amendments
illustrates this point succinctly. See Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What
the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852 (2013); Erwin
Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS
L.J. 901(1993); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (stating
the appropriate limits of constitutional rights and governmental power “come not from
drawing arbitrary lines, but rather a careful ‘respect for the teachings of history [and], solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.’”).
49

Helen Irving, Constitutional Interpretation, the High Court, and the Discipline of
History, 41 FED. L. REV. 95, 124-25 (2013).
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deciding a civil or criminal case based upon inaccurate or false statements. For in
those civil and criminal cases where a court lays an inaccurate factual foundation,
the subsequent legal analysis and holding will most certainly be insufficiently
reasoned and therefore illegitimate.50 In the words of late eighteenth-century jurist
and Supreme Court Justice James Wilson, “The more accuarately and the more
ingeniously men reason, and the farther they pursue their reasonings, from false
principles, the more numerous and inveterate will their inconsistencies, nay, their
absurdities be.”51 This baseline principle equally applies when historical myths are
incorporated into the constitutional equation. Any subsequent legal analysis and
holding will create an illegitimate foundation. But unlike the typical civil and
criminal case, incorporating historical myths into constitutional jurisprudence can
have far reaching negative effects in both law and society.52
The legal and societal repercussions of substituting historical myth in lieu of
historical fact are often ignored by members of the legal academy.53 Originalists,
however, have countered historians’ concerns of “law office history” by arguing it is
better than the alternative, “history office law” or inquiring into the meaning of the
Constitution, yet neglecting the distinctive aspects of the legal task at hand.54 Thus,
according to originalists, because historians are not trained legal professionals, it is
historians that are the greater threat to objective constitutional interpretation.55 To
state it in even simpler terms, many members of the legal academy perceive
themselves as being better equipped to interpret historical legal texts than
historians.56
This dismissal of historians is actually commonplace among originalists, but it is
a hypocritical and unsupported argument.57 It remains unclear why it is acceptable
50

CHARLES, supra note 1, at 87.

51

JAMES WILSON, 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 467 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark
David Hall eds., 2007).
52
David Thomas Konig, Heller, Guns, and History: The Judicial Invention of Tradition, 3
NE. U. L.J. 175, 177-78 (2011).
53

Of course, not every member of the legal academy has ignored the subject. See Matthew
J. Festa, Applying a Usable Past: The Use of History in Law, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 479
(2008); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (Yale University Press
1996); Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 601 (1995).
54

Lawson, supra note 32, at 1559; Saikrishna B. Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law Without
Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 534 (1998).
55

See Michael Rappaport, History Office Law, THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (Dec. 27, 2010),
http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2010/12/recently-i-linked-to-this-op-ed-bydistinguished-historian-pauline-meier-the-piece-defended-justice-breyers-comments-on-the.html.
56

Randy Barnett, Can Lawyers Ascertain the Original Meaning of the Constitution?, THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.volokh.com/2013/08/19/can-lawyersascertain-the-original-meaning-of-the-constitution/; Lawson, supra note 32, at 1559;
Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 115 (Univ. Ill. Coll. Of Law Ill. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, NO. 07-24, 2008). OR Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic
Originalism, at 34 (Nov. 22, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.
(citation taken from Strang’s article).
57
See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, Lawyers Masquerading as Historians, BALKINIZATION
(Nov. 21, 2013), http://balkin.blogspot.co.uk/2013/11/
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for the legal community to make legal claims about historical text, which often end
up contradicting what a thorough historical inquiry provides, yet it is unacceptable
for historians specializing in a particular era to perform the same task, especially in
cases where historical context is elicited to the greatest detail.58 According to
originalists, we should accept this academic double standard for two reasons. First,
given the Constitution’s language has not changed that much in two hundred years,
legal professionals are better suited to interpret legal texts. Second, the employment
of historical methodologies and constructs “without legal training” generally leads to
“dumb results.”59
These types of criticisms are a revelation to intellectual historians who specialize
in the interpretation of texts, to include their philosophical origins, meaning, and
influence in the public discourse, politics, and law. But even if originalists are
correct that the meaning of the Constitution’s text has not changed that much, the
overarching body of law existing at a particular time, to include the culture and
society with which it operates, has changed substantially. One cannot merely extract
those legal principles and lessons one likes and discard the others. Legal principles
all operate in conjunction within their respective era. This is what makes history in
law such a contentious topic among historians who see it as their duty to preserve the
past, for originalists often only want to carry forward those portions of the past they
agree with and discard the remainder. The overarching point here is a simple one.
Unless originalists can identify something more, some ethical or functionality
problem with the use of history in context to correct the problems associated with
originalism or “law office history” in general, claims of “history office law” are
more nominal than real.
Essentially the “history office law” argument is the equivalent of proclaiming
less information about the past produces better outcomes than more information.
Somehow we are more enlightened, as to the Constitution’s meaning and purpose, if
we focus intently on what its text means (or can make it mean) and subordinate the
larger social, political, intellectual, ideological, and philosophical considerations that
took place. It is a nonsensical argument seeing that many of the Constitution’s
phrases and terms of art embody much broader legal, intellectual, and philosophical
lawyers-masquerading-as-historians.html (“A historian of the Founding era is no better at
determining how we should interpret the Constitution than a lawyer. Much more than history
goes into that task. To be sure, history is a useful tool, and historians should step up to correct
inaccurate information that lawyers are using.”).
58
See generally Rakove, supra note 31, at 575-600 (dissenting to original and semantic
meaning originalism on contextual grounds).
59

Randy Barnett, My Fed Soc Panel on Textualist Interpretation, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.volokh.com/2013/11/19/fed-soc-panel-textualistinterpretation/. Barnett was clarifying what he meant at a Federalist Society event. See, e.g.,
Randy E. Barnett, Showcase Panel II: Textualism and Constitutional Interpretation, Statement
Before the Federalist Society 2013 National Lawyers Convention 14:18 (Nov. 15, 2013),
available at http://www.fed-soc.org/events/page/2013-national-lawyers-convention-schedule.
(“Ask a historian what the meaning of a legal text is in history, and you know what, unless
they are a trained lawyer they are not going to be able to tell you something that is very
helpful about it. Historians stock and trade is not legal interpretation. They are very bad at it.
They just say stupid things about legal interpretation, while they are saying wonderful things
about the periods they are studying. You need to be a lawyer in order to interpret legal
texts.”).
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principles than what any textually based inquiry will illuminate.60 This does not even
consider the jurisprudential consequences which may result from poor historical
paradigms.61
The intellectual and philosophical development of a free press circa the late
eighteenth century has already provided us with one illustration on this point. It is,
however, worth providing another, such as the Second Amendment’s reference to a
“well regulated Militia.”62 If one subscribes to new originalist methodologies—
which, according to Barnett, lead us to “discover an empirical fact”63—the phrase
“well regulated Militia” was a synonym for “well trained,” embodied the promise of
an “armed citizenry,” and cannot be read as limiting the “right of the people to keep
and bear arms” in any way.64 For contemporary readers unfamiliar with late
eighteenth-century society and law the conclusion makes sense.65 How are they to
know the intricacies of a “well regulated Militia” in late eighteenth-century terms?
For those historians who specialize in the rich history of standing armies and
militias from the sixteenth century through the turn of the nineteenth century,
however, such a construct is in direct contradiction to republican liberty. It would
make an “unregulated” or “ill-regulated” militia the historical equivalent of a wellregulated one.66 This is highly problematic seeing that a “well regulated Militia” was
intended to provide constitutional balance and united the people in defense of their
rights, liberties, and property in order to extol Machiavelli’s virtù and unite the
people as a common community. It was a state-sanctioned constitutional body
capable of bearing arms so men could train together in the art of war and foster an
esprit de corps. Such a body of citizen soldiers needed to be professionally
disciplined and trained, for this, and this only, prevented the establishment of
standing armies and provided a constitutional check on the federal government.67
60

See, e.g., Irving, supra note 49, at 123 (criticizing how a textualist focus “reveals
nothing about the context or purpose of the object” being examined).
61

Charles & O’Neill, supra note 40, at 1751-52.

62

U.S. CONST., amend. II.

63

Barnett, supra note 8, at 415.

64

See Barnett, supra note 29, at 273-77; see also David T. Hardy, Ducking the Bullet:
District of Columbia v. Heller and the Stevens Dissent, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 61,
67 (2010); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 85, 144 (2d ed., 1994); David I. Caplan, Restoring the Balance: The
Second Amendment Revisited, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31 (1976).
65
Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Believes Americans Have Right to Own Guns, GALLUP (Mar. 27,
2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/105721/public-believes-americans-right-own-guns.aspx.
66

See SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN
AMERICA (Oxford University Press 2006); LOIS G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS,
1689 74-78 (John Hopkins University Press 1981); H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G.
MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL
SILENT (Duke University Press 2003).
67
See Patrick J. Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia”
Asserted and Proven with Commentary on the Future of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 3
NE. U. L.J. 1, 9-85 (2011); Patrick J. Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, the Second
Amendment, and Individual Militia Rights: A Legal and Historical Perspective, 9 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 323, 374-90 (2011).
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Here again we find an example of how originalism, particularly its adherence to
textualist methodologies, can result in an illegitimate understanding of the past.68
Constitutional constructs are illegitimate when they are based on illegitimate
historical foundations. Eliciting historical context to the greatest detail is the only
means of alleviating this dilemma.69 It provides a far more legitimate guidepost to
reason and creates constitutional constructs. As I have outlined elsewhere, when
applying history in law the goal should be to employ the evidentiary record
thoroughly, accurately, and objectively. This in turn provides the best foundation
from which to legally reason.70
History is not, has never been, nor should it ever be the entire means and ends of
constitutional interpretation.71 There are just too many unknowns and unanswered
questions for history to be law’s sole driving force. History is much better suited as a
philosophical and moral guide towards understanding the law’s development.72 This
in turn minimizes mythmaking and the creation of poor constitutional constructs.
This does not mean, however, that to legally reason from subjective historical
accounts or myth can never be a legitimate enterprise. Before exploring this issue,
though, one must distinguish between what constitutes myth and the pursuit of an
objective historical account, particularly within the construct of history in law.
68

In terms of the Second Amendment, the failure rests on originalists’ inability to conduct
a thorough ideological or intellectual historical investigation. It is a problem that persists to
this day. See, e.g., Barnett, Showcase Panel II, supra note 59, at 14:18 (stating, “[l]ike those
who previously defended the collective rights interpretation [of the Second Amendment],
proponents of the new militia conditioned individual right were unable to produce a single
example of anyone, during the founding period, who said this was the meaning of the right to
keep and bear arms. In short, they could not provide a single example of anyone who they
expressed everyone claimed everyone held…”). For an historical refutation of Barnett’s claim,
see Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment in Historiographical Crisis: Why the Supreme
Court Must Reevaluate the Embarrassing “Standard Model” Moving Forward, 39 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1727, 1336-46, 1761-67 (2012).
69

This applies to the interpretation of legal texts. One must not only focus on the text to be
interpreted, but also on the issues or themes which the text is concerned and the larger mental
world from which it is derived. See Quentin Skinner, Motives, Intentions and the
Interpretation of Texts, 3 NEW LITERARY HISTORY 393, 406-7 (1972).
70

Rakove, supra note 31, at 580 (“[T]he only possible way in which one could
satisfactorily reconstruct the original meaning of a constitutional text must necessarily involve
an essentially historical inquiry. Such an inquiry would have to take careful account of the
sources, explaining how and why a document was drafted, debated, and finally approved. It
would involve immersion in the kinds of sources that historians ordinarily use and would need
to consider the array of purposes shaping their action.”).
71

This is not to say history cannot affect constitutional outcomes. See, e.g., Dred Scott v.
Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 410 (1856); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Myth-Making: Lessons
from the Dred Scott Case, The Univ. of Chicago Law School Occasional Paper No. 37, 2
(1996) (“Dred Scott was one of the first great cases unambiguously using the ‘intent of the
framers’ . . . .”).
72

CHARLES, supra note 1, at 85-86; see Wofford, supra note 25, at 528-33. Recently,
constitutional historian Saul Cornell has put forth a similar argument by stating the “basic
methods of intellectual history” offer a more honest approach to understanding the
Constitution’s origins than originalism; see also Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in
the History of Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 721 (2013).
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I. HISTORY, MYTH, AND HISTORY IN LAW: A DISCOURSE
Defining what constitutes myth and history has been an ongoing debate among
historians for over a century. The debate centers on whether there can truly ever be
such a thing as an objective historical account.73 Given that all historical inquiries
grow out of the respective historian’s ideological mind, it is argued the writing of
history is not so much about truth-seeking as it is about the ideological leanings of
the respective historian. In other words, critics of objective history frequently claim
that one historian’s truth is another’s falsity.74 What drives this criticism is the
frequency in which historical narratives can change. But shifts in historical
narratives are not so much driven by the respective historian’s subjectivity or
personal bias, but by academic curiosity. Historians are asking more questions than
ever from a variety of social and intellectual viewpoints. These inquiries continue to
develop because up to the mid nineteenth century nationalistic historical narratives
were hindering an objective understanding of the past.75 Not only did these narratives
oversimplify the complexities of a particular event or era, they reconstructed the past
through the lens of the present, not through the lens of the time period in question.76
In any case there is an argument to be made that all history is myth and all myth
is history.77 No matter how much of the evidentiary record is uncovered, no historian
can ever fully reconstruct the past as it was. In their totality, those moments in
history are lost forever. The best any historian can do is build upon those evidentiary
remnants which remain. Still, at one level or another, historians will have to make a
number of assumptions about the past. In some instances the assumptions will be
small or minute because the evidentiary record is rich with information about the
past, allowing the respective historian to recreate an event or time period in
excruciating detail. In other instances the assumptions can be substantial, especially
when the evidentiary record is barren, requiring the respective historian to fill the
evidentiary gaps. But whenever historians make any assumptions about the past—
whether they are minor or substantial—they are perpetuating myth in some form or
another.
Considering this fact, it is understandable when critics of history in law denounce
the practice as being replete with errors and unreliable.78 To completely remove
73

See generally PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE ‘OBJECTIVITY
THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (Cambridge University Press 1998).

QUESTION’ AND

74
William H. McNeill, Mythistory, or Truth, Myth, History, and Historians, 91 THE AM.
HIST. REV. 1, 1 (1986).
75

For a detailed discussion, see JOYCE APPLEBY, LYNN HUNT, & MARGARET JACOB,
TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY 198-270 (W.W. Norton & Company 1994);
see also Joyce Appleby, The Power of History, 103 THE AM. HIST. REV. 1 (1998); Irving,
supra note 49, at 100-102.
76

As historian Herbert Butterfield aptly observed in 1931: “Real historical understanding
is not achieved by the subordination of the past to the present, but rather by making the past
our present and attempting to see life with the eyes of another century than our own.”
BUTTERFIELD, supra note 27, at 16.
77

For some discussions on this point, see Jonathan Friedman, Myth, History, and Political
Identity, 7 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 194 (1992); M.I. Finley, Myth, Memory, and History, 4
HIST. & THEORY 281 (1965).
78

See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note 47, at 7-32.
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history in law from the interpretational process, however, is to undo the law itself. If
one pauses to consider how case facts, judicial precedent, and legal text all embody
facets of history, one cannot dispute that history is the law and the law is history.79
The two disciplines are inseparable. There are indeed objectivity problems with the
general practice of history in law, but as long as these problems are acknowledged
and the practice is reformed in a way that minimizes subjectivity to the greatest
extent, history in law can provide an invaluable tool from which to legally reason. In
the words of the late Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., despite the problems associated with
history in law, there is in “history a meaning, and a meaning that has value for law,
as it has for the spirit of man in many another aspect.”80 History not only provides us
with “another perspective or value against which to measure law,” but it also
“teaches us the nature of legitimate authority.”81
What qualifies as “history” among legal professionals as compared to historians
are often two different things.82 What many legal professionals deem as history is
what historians would classify as “law office history” or historical myth. In a panel
discussion before Ohio University, Pulitzer Prize winning historian Gordon S. Wood
recently articulated this line of argument, particularly as it applied to Supreme Court
jurisprudence, stating:
I have no doubt that the Supreme Court should use history and will use
history, but there is no doubt in my mind also that it’s not really history
that the justices are using. It’s not the history that historians write, and I
would go beyond that and say it’s impossible for jurists, law professors,
and Supreme Court justices—or judges anywhere—to really use history.
It simply would not work. Judges have to invent another kind of history:
We call it “law office history,” or “history lite.” It’s a necessary fiction,
and I don’t consider that to be a bad thing. It’s a necessary fiction for
judges and other jurists to get along with their work—they need some
kind of history to work with. History is much too complicated to be used
effectively by judges and the courts.83
Wood’s observation that the practice of history in law is not really history is
worth noting, but it is an outdated criticism.84 Certainly most historians would agree
with Wood that the general practice of history in law is rife with subjective
intentions. But there have been instances where legal professionals have produced
excellent histories or where jurists have invoked history in law responsibly,
79

Festa, supra note 53, at 483-85; MILLER, supra note 24, at 20-21.

80

Wyzanski, Jr., supra note 23, at 244.

81

Id.; see also Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387,
395 (2003) (“When lawyers, judges, and legal scholars turn to history, they do so because they
believe, and want their readers to believe, that an historical pedigree adds authority to their
argument.”).
82

See, e.g., John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 195-97 (1993).

83

Gordon S. Wood & Scott D. Gerber, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History, 39
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 435, 443 (2013).
84

See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1997).
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especially where history is a moral and philosophical guidepost to the law’s
development.85 To characterize the invocation of history in these latter instances as
“law office history” or “history lite” would be improper.
What Wood also fails to mention is that one cannot solely point the finger at
legal professionals for the problems associated with history in law. For decades,
professional historians gave little attention to the fields of legal and constitutional
history. It was not until the rise of originalism, in the late twentieth century, that
historians became deeply troubled by the problems originalist methodologies
present. Today, given originalism is more prominent than ever, it is as if every
constitutional provision is being explored through some form of history in law.86
This is indeed a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, it is a curse given that the
majority of these inquiries do not adhere to the primary rule of any historical
inquiry—understanding the past for the sake of the past. At the same time, these
inquiries are a blessing in disguise because they provide historians with an infinite
number of topics from which to reexamine the past. The more historians explore
such topics, the more accurate, objective, and therefore legitimate the practice of
history in law will become. As historian Paul Murphy remarked fifty years ago, so
long as historians furnish “complementary modern architectural materials,” the
courts will “not have to rely upon scrap lumber, salvage bricks, and raw stones”
when adjudicating constitutional cases and controversies from an historical
standpoint.87
This is not to say advocates—whether they are lawyers or legal scholars—will
ever end the practice of “law office history.” It is the advocates’ roles to advance
their causes by any means necessary. This includes compiling or cherry-picking
historical evidence in their favor, all the while ignoring what a thorough historical
inquiry provides or even discussing the limits of historical explanation.88 The
interpretational consequences associated with “law office history,” however, are not
in the hands of advocates.89 It is the judiciary that is the gatekeeper of how history is
relevant to the respective case or controversy, the manner in which history in law is
applied, and what historical evidence is to be admitted.90 Therefore, when historians
85

John Phillip Reid, Bruce Ackerman, Kurt Lash, and Barry Friedman are a few notable
examples. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(Wisconsin University Press 1986); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
(Harvard University Press 1993); KURT T. LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH
AMENDMENT (Oxford University Press 2009); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:
HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF
THE CONSTITUTION (Farrar, Straus, & Giroux 2009).
86
For the rise of originalism and its continued appeal, see Jamal Greene, Nathaniel
Persily, & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356 (2011);
JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY (John Hopkins University Press 2005).
87

Murphy, supra note 2, at 78.

88

Melton, supra note 24, at 382-88.

89

Reid, supra note 82, at 203-5.

90

Wiecek, supra note 2, at 227-28. See also Berger, supra note 31, at 360-68 (discussing
the problems associated with history in law, originalism, and judicial decision making, and
judicial restraint).
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provide the most accurate, thoroughly documented, impeccable history they are
capable of producing, it operates as a counterpoise to the false historical claims of
advocates.91 In fact, a number of jurists look to the writings and opinions of
historians when history is presented to the court, for they feel compelled to operate
under the assumption the history being presented by the respective parties is that of
the law office variety.92
Jurists like these are not seeking to perpetuate what Wood refers to as a
“necessary fiction” or to engage in judicial mythmaking.93 They are not seeking to
rewrite the past or proclaim one historical narrative is better suited for the present
than another. Instead, these jurists desire to know whether there exists a sufficient
historical foundation and its explanatory limits. In other words, they are in search of
objective historical truths from which to legally reason. One cannot classify this
pursuit under the subheadings of fiction or mythmaking. It is a reasonable inquiry.94
What constitutes an objective historical truth—and whether there is such a thing—is
debatable, but it generally depends on whether the respective historical claim
qualifies as myth, theory or thesis. The three categories are distinguishable by the
breadth of evidentiary record, the connection between pieces of evidence, and the
historical methodologies employed by the historian.
Let us begin with historical myth. It is an historical claim generally rooted in
some form of societal tradition.95 In some instances, the myth is trivial and retains
broad support from the populace such as the belief that George Washington’s teeth
were made of wood.96 In other instances, the myth can have serious societal
consequences, yet exists in only a subset of the population, such as the case of the
individual tyranny model of the right to “keep and bear arms.”97 In any case the
individual’s belief in the respective myth is not based on concrete historical
evidence, its interconnection or the employment of even the most basic historical
methodologies. Instead it is a historical claim that each individual chooses to believe,

91

Murphy, supra note 2, at 77.

92

Taylor et al., supra note 46, at 1896, 1908; see also A. Raymond Randolph, Originalism
and History: The Case of Boumediene v. Bush, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89 (2011).
93

Wood & Gerber, supra note 83, at 443.

94

Powell, Rules for Originalists, supra note 26, at 661.

95

Peter Heehs, Myth, History, and Theory, 33 HIST. & THEORY 1, 1-2 (1994).

96

CHARLES, supra note 1, at 85-86.

97

This understanding is part of the Standard Model Second Amendment. See, e.g., Randy
Barnett, “Constitutionally Speaking” . . . About the Second Amendment, Remarks as Guest on
New
Hampshire
Public
Radio
(Feb.
22,
2013),
available
at
http://nhpr.org/post/constitutionally-speaking-about-second-amendment (“The reason why the
militia was thought to be essential…is in part to protect a country from tyranny. In fact . . .
privately armed civilians have . . . been able to resist oppressive governments with organized
militaries throughout the world. It is not always pretty and not always successful, but it does
raise the cost of tyranny . . . .”). For an historical rebuttal to Barnett’s historical claim on this
point, see Patrick J. Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation and Resistance: A True Legal and
Historical Understanding of the Anglo-American Right to Arms, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE
NOVO 18 (2010).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/6

16

2014]

HISTORY IN LAW

39

whether that choice is a conscious or unconscious one.98 As historian Edward G.
Lengel frames it, this is because individuals make cognitive choices that “reveal
more about us”99 than they do about what the historical record provides. It is natural
for individuals to “define themselves” through their own knowledge and beliefs of
history rather than seek historical truth or clarity.100
An historical theory may also be rooted in historical tradition, but unlike
historical myths, historical theories are based on an evidentiary record, albeit an
incomplete one. To state the premise more succinctly, historical theories essentially
facilitate research agendas for other historians to prove or disprove. It is a history in
progress so to speak. When an historical claim is categorized as an historical theory
it can be due to any number of evidentiary factors. The historical evidence may only
be loosely connected, retain significant gaps that require the historian to make large
educated assumptions, or the historian may even openly admit he or she has not
conducted an exhaustive search of the historical evidence. Whatever the evidentiary
deficiency at hand, it creates a scenario where the historian has left the reader with
more questions than answers.
One prominent example of what constitutes an historical theory is Charles
Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution. Written in 1913, Beard
asserted the framers were primarily motivated by wealth in adopting the
Constitution. In doing so, however, Beard admitted his claim was based on an
incomplete record and a number of historical assumptions. “The requirement for an
economic interpretation of the formation and adoption of the Constitution may be
stated in a hypothetical proposition which, although it cannot be verified absolutely
from ascertainable data,” wrote Beard, “will at once illustrate the problem and
furnish a guide to research and generalization.”101
Where an historical thesis distinguishes itself from an historical theory is the
level to which the evidentiary record speaks. While an historical theory retains a
loose interconnection between pieces of historical evidence, an historical thesis
maintains a substantial and intimately woven interconnection between pieces of
evidence. Again, as with all historical claims, even an historical thesis requires the
historian to make any number of assumptions, at one level or another, because the
past can never be fully restored. An historical thesis, however, is built upon accepted
historical methodologies intended to elicit context to the greatest detail.102
Of the three aforementioned options—historical myth, historical theory, and
historical thesis—the one that is closest to an objective historical truth is the
historical thesis. Therefore, when it comes to the practice of history in law, historical
98

Paul Horwitz, The Past, Tense: The History of Crisis—and the Crisis of History—in
Constitutional Theory, 61 ALB. L. REV. 459, 505 (1997).
99
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AND MEMORY xviii (Harper 2011).

GEORGE WASHINGTON: AMERICA’S FOUNDER, IN MYTH

100

Id.; see also Joseph Mali, Jacob Burckhardt: Myth, History, and Mythistory, 3 HIST. &
MEMORY 86, 86-88 (1991).
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CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION
UNITED STATES 16 (Macmillan Company 1913).
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This is not to say the historical methodologies should not be continuously adapted and
improved to elicit context to the greatest detail. See, e.g., James T. Kloppenberg, Thinking
Historically: A Manifesto of Pragmatic Hermeneutics, 9 MOD. INTELL. HIST. 212 (2012).
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theses provide the most legitimate foundation from which to legally reason. It
ensures jurists are relying on those historical claims that have been proven to a
greatest degree of specificity.103 This is not to say it is completely illegitimate for
jurists to reason from an historical theory. There will be instances where the only
answer history can provide to a particular question is theoretical. In fact, a number of
historical theories and interpretations may be available, leaving jurists with multiple
options from which to choose. In some cases there will be a point of consensus
among the competing historical claims, while in others there will be divisive
conflict.104 Whatever the scenario, so long as the jurist acknowledges the existence of
the competing historical claims, understands the historical limits of the evidentiary
record, and retains historical consciousness when selecting a respective historical
account from which to legally reason, the resulting historical foundation can still be
legitimate because the jurist is being honest and forthright about his or her choice.105
Illegitimacy can seep in in those instances where one historical conflict is built
on another conflict, and so forth.106 To assume this approach to history in law is to
openly engage in the myth-making process, which in turn leads to an illegitimate
foundation for legal reasoning; the justification being historical myth is on the
opposite spectrum to achieving an objective historical truth. It is the equivalent of
importing an inaccurate statement of facts or relying on hearsay when deciding a
criminal case. This does not mean, however, that the use or acceptance of myth for
history in law is always illegitimate—an issue this article addresses in the following
section.
II. THE LEGITIMACY OF HISTORICAL MYTH IN CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
There are at least two scenarios (and perhaps others) where historical myth
provides an acceptable foundation from which to legally reason. The first scenario
takes place when a law or constitutional provision was drafted, enacted, ratified or
universally understood under the auspices of a mythical historical narrative or
construct. Although history in context informs us this narrative or construct is false,
the fact of the matter is it was considered as true to the generation responsible for the
law or constitutional provision at issue. It truly is a “necessary fiction” so to speak.107
The second scenario can take place when the law, as currently constituted, is so
reliant on a mythical historical narrative or construct that to correct it, and thereby
overturn the legal precedent it established, would have severe consequences. In a
103
Julius Goebel, Jr., Ex Parte Clio, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 450, 451 (1954) (“The writing of
history requires maximum effort in the discovery of evidence and the utmost candor in
presentation, for in no other way can the interests of truth be served. Only when these
obligations are first discharged should the art of the interpreter be exercised.”).
104
Some history-in-law commentators argue that jurists should only rely on historical
consensus when importing the past for use in the present. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 2, at
1277-83.
105

This task is not to be confused with merely acknowledging the contradictory historical
data and explaining it away. Compare Kramer, supra note 81, at 402-7, with Mark Tushnet,
Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-in-Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909,
917-25 (1996).
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CHARLES, supra note 1, at 116-18.
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Wood & Gerber, supra note 83, at 443.
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way, the second scenario is very similar to the rules of stare decisis. It requires the
judiciary to adhere to the previously established foundation even if the historical
construct is no longer true.108
If one applies these two scenarios to the practice of history in law, the instances
in which historical myth may provide a legitimate foundation to legally reason are
somewhat frequent. Take for instance the Senate’s recent debate and vote over the
Employment and Discrimination Act that would prohibit workplace discrimination
against gay, bisexual and transgender Americans. Those senators that voted in favor
of the bill did so by invoking what they perceived to be the spirit of the Declaration
of Independence. “[This bill] is certainly about the vision of the Declaration of
Independence that has the promise of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness as the
founding motivation,” stated Oregon Senator Jeff Merkley.109
Today, the perception of the Declaration as a bill of equity that offers the
promises of equality, natural rights, and happiness is commonplace among
politicians and the public.110 To borrow from Pulitzer Prize winning historian Jack
Rakove, “The meanings Americans now assign to the Declaration of Independence .
. . have relatively little to do with the circumstances of its creation or Thomas
Jefferson’s purposes, and everything to do with the ideas of equality that,
inadvertently or otherwise, it eventually created.”111 Yet, in the late eighteenth
century, the Declaration was neither intended nor understood as affording such a
promise. It was the legal means through which the American colonists declared
independence to the world.112 Independence was sought for many reasons as was
detailed throughout the Declaration’s grievances. These grievances were more
nominal than real, with the actual impetus being the need to enlist foreign support for
the war.113

108
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
109

Donna Cassata, Senate Moves Ahead on Gay Rights Bill; Republican Foes Largely
Remain Silent, STAR TRIBUNE (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.startribune.com/
politics/230611861.html.
110
For some scholarly discussions on this point, see Alexander Tsesis, Self-Government
and the Declaration of Independence, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 693 (2012);
SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (New York University Press 1995); PETER CHARLES
HOFFER, THE LAW’S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 71-80
(University of North Carolina Press 1990); Martin Diamond, The American Idea of Equality:
The View from the Founding, 38 THE REV. OF POL. 313 (1976).
111

Rakove, supra note 31, at 578.
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See, e.g., David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence and International Law, 59
WM. & MARY Q. 39, 46-47 (2002). Despite the Declaration of Independence’s purpose being
expressly stipulated in its title, only one-third of United States eighth graders can restate it.
See Ilya Somin, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor on Political Ignorance, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.volokh.com/2013/09/06/justice-sandra-day-oconnorpolitical-ignorance/.
113

See generally PATRICK J. CHARLES, IRRECONCILABLE GRIEVANCES: THE EVENTS
SHAPED THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (Heritage Books 2008).
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Despite what the evidentiary record provides about Declaration at the time of its
enactment, both its purpose and meaning have evolved from generation to
generation.114 When the controversy over slavery and race intensified in the
Antebellum Era (1800-1860), the Declaration’s pronouncement that “all men are
created equal” had become a common talking point among politicians,115 particularly
among abolitionists and women’s rights activists, who viewed the phrase as a
political equalizer and embodiment of the promise of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness” for all.116 Proponents of the societal status quo, however, argued the
Declaration did not actually promise civil and political equality. As Stephen A.
Douglas stated in a debate with Abraham Lincoln, “[B]ut the signers of that papers
did not intend to include the Indian or negro in that declaration . . . for if they had
would they not have been bound to abolish slavery in every state?”117 It was this
contextual view of the Declaration that Chief Justice Roger Taney espoused in Dred
Scott v. Sanford:
The general words [of the Declaration of Independence] would seem to
embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar
instrument at this day would be so understood. But it is too clear for
dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included . .
. for if the language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the
conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of
Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the
principles they asserted . . . 118
If history in context matters, it must be admitted the Douglas-Taney view of the
Declaration is more in line with the collective views of Thomas Jefferson, the
drafting committee, and those enacting members of the Continental Congress. In
addition to declaring independence to the world, the Declaration espoused the legal
proposition that “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” were the constitutional
foundation on which both the state and federal governments were to be based.119
114

See generally THE DECLARATION
Douglas Gerber ed., 2002).

OF

INDEPENDENCE: ORIGINS

AND

IMPACT (Scott

115

This can be found in various political platforms in the mid nineteenth century. See
NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840-1972 5, 13, 18, 27, 32 (Kirk H. Porter & Donald Bruce
Johnson eds., 2d ed. 1961).
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See Strang, supra note 10, at 417-23; ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A LEGAL HISTORY 101-10 (New York University
Press 2004); PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE 197-200 (Alfred A. Knopf 1997); Linda K. Kerber, From the Declaration of
Independence to the Declaration of Sentiments: The Legal Status of Women in the Early
Republic 1776-1848, 6 HUM RTS. 115, 115-24 (1977).
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CREATED EQUAL?: THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858 62-63 (Paul M.
Angle ed., 1958).
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Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 410 (1856).
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Patrick J. Charles, Restoring “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” in Our
Constitutional Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Legal History, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
457, 458, 464-66 (2011). I have placed emphasis on the word “polity” because the Declaration
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What “all men are created equal” meant was that every member of the polity is to be
afforded “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” on equitable principles.120
Still, these historical certainties extinguish neither how the Republicans of the
Reconstruction Era (1865-1877) viewed the Declaration, nor how they applied its
tenets when proposing legislation to protect those freed by the Thirteenth
Amendment.121 To them, the Declaration embodied a set of principles that
government should strive for, particularly as it related to equal civil and political
rights.122 For instance, during the debate over whether to grant Freedman the political
right to vote in the District of Columbia, Illinois Representative John F. Farnsworth
called upon the Declaration to rebut those members of Congress who would deny
such a right:
Our fathers, when they framed the Declaration of Independence, declared
that all men were created equal . . . [what they meant], so far as . . .
natural rights were concerned, that one man was equal to any other man.
They declared, and made the declaration one of the principles of the
Government which they established, that all men inherited the same
rights. They declared that all men had the right to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. And they said more than that. They said that
Governments were instituted to protect these rights. They said that the just
powers of government were derived from the consent of the governed. If
that be true, if Governments are instituted among men deriving there just
powers from the consent of the governed, will some gentlemen . . . tell me
why this body of men who are under the Government have not the same
right as I have to participate in it?123
When the Senate took up the equal representation bill, Massachusetts Senator
Henry Wilson also invoked the Declaration as embodying “sublime truths” that
society has now accepted.124 “We stand as the champions of human rights for all
men, black and white, the wide world over,” stated Wilson, “and we mean that just
and equal laws shall pervade every rood of this nation . . . .”125 Ohio Representative
Samuel Shellabarger echoed these sentiments during a House debate over the same
bill. He hoped the equal representation bill would help restore the “spirit” of the
framers’ Constitution, which he perceived as having been ignored by the judiciary
“the people” sought to include them. See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, Our* Illegal Founders, 16
HARV. LAT. L. REV. 147, 158 (2013). This is an historical myth given the founding
generation’s greatest legal minds perceived it to be every nation’s right to include or exclude
foreigners in the interest of national self-preservation. See CHARLES, supra note 1, at 87-92.
120
Charles, Restoring “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” in Our Constitutional
Jurisprudence, supra note 119, at 481-523.
121

See, e.g., Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of
Independence, Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 361 (1993).
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See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment: Recalling What the Court
Forgot, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 911, 933, 985-86 (2008).
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for seventy years.126 “I had hoped that the judiciary of the Government would begin
to look at the Constitution in the light of the Declaration of Independence, which
said, and as truly as gloriously, that ‘all men are created equal,’” stated
Shellabarger.127
The belief held among members of the Reconstruction Congresses that they must
restore the framers’ Constitution was not limited to the concept of equal political
representation. When debating the 1866 Civil Rights Bill, Massachusetts Senator
Charles Sumner, Illinois Senator Lyman Trumbull, and Minnesota Representative
William Windom each invoked the Declaration of Independence as legal
authority.128 Windom, in particular, viewed the Declaration as a bill of equity:
This [bill], I believe, is one of the first efforts made since the formation of
the Government to give practical effect to the principles of the
Declaration of Independence; one of the first attempts to grasp a vital
reality and embody in the forms of law the great truth that all men are
created equal and endowed by the Creator with the inalienable rights of
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. If there be any reasonable
objection to the bill, it is that it does not go far enough. It assumes only to
protect civil rights, and leaves the adjustment and protection of political
rights to future legislation.129
On April 9, 1866, over the veto of President Andrew Johnson, the Civil Rights
Bill was signed into law by Congress as the 1866 Civil Rights Act, and it afforded
equal rights to all males “without distinction of race or color, or previous condition
of slavery or involuntary servitude.”130 Following concerns over the Act’s
constitutionality, however, along with the fear that the Act would eventually be
nullified upon the Southern States being readmitted into the Union, Republicans
pushed for the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.131 Although one may assert
that the 1866 Civil Rights Act and Fourteenth Amendment cannot be read in
conjunction because they contain different wording and emerged from different
political situations,132 the evidentiary record strongly suggests that both represented
the same body of law,133 particularly as it relates to principles of equality.134
126
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Hon. Charles Sumner, Of Massachusetts, in the Senate of the United States, Feb. 5,
1866, in BOSTON DAILY JOURNAL, Feb. 6, 1866, at supplement pg. 1, cols. 1-2; Senator
Trumbull, in BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, Jan. 30, 1866, at pg. 1, col. 2; see also Reinstein,
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doctrine of equal rights was expressed across the Republican ideological spectrum.”).
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the Fourteenth Amendment, see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE
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See Garrett Epps, The Citizenship Clause: A “Legislative History,” 60 AM. U. L. REV.
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Hereto, in describing the intentions and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Republicans called upon the Declaration’s rhetoric. Illinois Senator Richard Yates
was one such Republican, stating: “I would write in the fundamental and
unchangeable law of the land, that the Declaration of American Independence was a
verity, that all men were created equal; and having the powers which this Congress
now has, I would prove my belief by making the Declaration a reality.”135
Pennsylvania Representative Thaddeus Stevens equally pressed the importance of
making the spirit and promise of the Declaration a living reality. In Stevens’ words,
“[O]ur fathers made the Declaration of Independence; and that is what they intended
to be the foundation of Government. If they had been able to base their Constitution
on the principles of that Declaration it would have needed no amendment during all
time, for every human being would have had his rights, every human being would
have been equal before the law[.]”136 Then there was Pennsylvania Representative
George F. Miller, who described Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment as being
“so clearly within the spirit of the Declaration of Independence . . . that no member
of this House can seriously object to it.”137 It was a position Vermont Senator Luke
Poland echoed when he described Section 1 as “the very spirit and inspiration of our
system of government,” which was “essentially declared in the Declaration of
Independence and in all the provisions of the Constitution.”138
Taken altogether, what this brief overview reveals is the Fourteenth Amendment
was perceived by most Reconstruction Republicans as enshrining the Declaration’s
promise of equality within the Constitution.139 Again, it is worth noting that members
of the founding generation may not have perceived the Declaration as guaranteeing
such a promise, thus making the Reconstruction Republicans perception more of an
historical fiction than reality. It does, however, provide a case in point of utilizing a
“necessary fiction” when analyzing the scope of a constitutional provision. This does
not mean that the Reconstruction Republicans’ rehabilitated understanding of the
Declaration modifies its late eighteenth-century meaning and purpose. It simply
361, 382 (2009) (making this line of argument in relation to the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights to the States).
133

See Patrick J. Charles, Decoding the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause:
Unlawful Immigrants, Allegiance, Personal Subjection, and the Law, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 211,
225-28, 231 (2011) (showing the 1866 Civil Right Act and Fourteenth Amendment’s
definition of citizenship were viewed as synonymous); Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the
Privileges Or Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming
Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1, 51-55 (1996)
(showing the 1866 Civil Right Act and Fourteenth Amendment both sought to apply the Bill
of Rights to the States).
134
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Alfred A. Moss, Jr. eds., 1991).
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means it is constitutionally legitimate for a lawyer, jurist or legal scholar to apply
this “necessary fiction” when interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment;140 that is, so
long as one acknowledges the Reconstruction Republicans’ understanding of the
Declaration is not one and the same with the founding generation. To do otherwise
would advance a Whiggish or illegitimate view of the past.
In addition to the history of the Fourteenth Amendment providing an example of
a constitutionally legitimate mythical narrative or construct of the past, it also
provides a case in point where jurisprudentially correcting an historical narrative
may have severe consequences—the complete resurrection of the amendment’s
Privileges or Immunities Clause. The clause stipulates that “[n]o state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States,”141 and, since the Supreme Court’s 1873 decision in The
Slaughterhouse Cases, has been jurisprudentially understood as differentiating
between rights associated with federal and state citizenship.142 To this day, despite
the breadth of historical scholarship showing the numerous inaccuracies with The
Slaughterhouse Cases—particularly how the Court failed to incorporate the Bill of
Rights to the States through the Privileges or Immunities Clause143 as its drafters and
ratifiers intended—the protective scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
remains unaltered.144 As a jurisprudential alternative the Court has incorporated the
Bill of Rights piecemeal through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
and in doing so, has extended its protections to citizens and non-citizens alike.145
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For a similar line of argument, see Tsesis, supra note 110, at 708-9.
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Immunities, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1295 (2009); Richard L. Aynes, Enforcing the Bill of
Rights Against the States: The History and the Future, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 77
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McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758 (2010) (Alito, J.). At least one current
Supreme Court Justice, Clarence Thomas, has attempted to correct what many perceive to be
an historical wrong. Id. at 805 (Thomas, J., concurring). For the importance of Thomas’s
concurrence from a jurisprudential standpoint, see David S. Cohen, The Paradox of McDonald
v. City of Chicago, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 1 (2010). For the claim that Justice
Thomas reinvigorated the Privileges or Immunities Clause, see Randy Barnett, Privileges or
Immunities Clause Alive Again, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2010, 5:01 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/06/privileges-or-immunities-clause-alive-again/; see also
Richard Aynes, McDonald v. City of Chicago, Self-Defense, the Right to Bear Arms, and the
Future, 2 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POL’Y 181 (2011).
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For two notable Due Process Clause incorporation test cases preceding McDonald v.
City of Chicago, see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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Herein lies a consequence with jurisprudentially revising or correcting The
Slaughterhouse Cases—the exclusion of non-citizens from substantive rights.146 For
if the Supreme Court recategorized every incorporated right from the Due Process
Clause to the Privileges or Immunities Clause it would prevent any number of rights
from extending to non-citizens. As a counter point, those who support revising the
jurisprudence of the Privileges or Immunities Clause assert that to ignore its intent
and purpose is to deny United States citizens a number of rights from state
abridgement, including the Third Amendment right against the quartering of soldiers
in homes,147 the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury,148 the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury in civil trials,149 the Eight Amendment right against excessive bails
and fines,150 and potentially any number of unenumerated rights.151 Although this
line of argument has proved tempting to many originalists and progressives, it would
essentially create a jurisprudential vacuum152 that not only swallows up the rights of
non-citizens, but would also wreak havoc on a number of state laws and regulations,
as well as undermine a range of unenumerated rights such as the right to marry, to
have children, to use contraception, and perhaps others.153
Still, for many originalists and progressives, these concerns are either over
exaggerated, mistaken or do not outweigh the benefits of a reinvigorated Privileges
or Immunities Clause.154 Even assuming, though, that revitalizing the Privileges or
Immunities Clause will have minimal consequences on existing constitutional
jurisprudence, it does present the objectivity dilemma of conflicting history.155 As I
briefly touched on earlier, to jurisprudentially rely on conflicting or dueling history
146
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Dale E. Ho, Dodging a Bullet: McDonald v.
City of Chicago and the Limits of Progressive Originalism, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 369,
402-14 (2010); Richard A. Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: Reconstructing the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 334, 349-53
(2005).
147
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Arms to the States, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 22-44 (2010).
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McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 859 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The
burden is severe for those who seek radical change in such an established body of
constitutional doctrine. Moreover, the suggestion that invigorating the Privileges or
Immunities Clause will reduce judicial discretion . . . strikes me as implausible, if not exactly
backwards.”).
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CENTER (Feb. 3, 2011), http://theusconstitution.org/text-history/2734.
155

Boyce, supra note 36, at 33-36.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014

25

48

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:23

for constitutional interpretation calls into question the legitimacy of any subsequent
legal analysis.156 This is not to say, however, conflicting history cannot be navigated
in a legitimate manner. One option available is to find historical consensus where
there is conflict or to follow the historical path of least resistance. What this
embodies is relying on those broader facets of the evidentiary record that are not in
historical dispute. Here the respective interpreter retains historical consciousness to
frame the legal issue in historical terms, but to a lesser degree.157
The other option available is to choose conflicting history where there is conflict.
Indeed, to pick and choose between dueling historical accounts brings us into the
arena of “law office history,” however, there are two baseline rules that can mitigate
the abuse of the evidentiary record and prevent the interpreter’s own predilections
from impacting the conflicting choice. The first rule requires the interpreter to be
honest and transparent as to why he or she made the respective historical choice.
Essentially what this entails is the retention of historical consciousness by weighing
the purposes and consequences of each choice in total historical context. To commit
a minor violation of “law office history” is acceptable, but to create a domino chain
of conflicting history can have far-reaching consequences. This brings us to the
second rule when choosing conflicting history where there is conflict—the
interpreter cannot build conflict upon conflict. To state it another way, when the
interpreter chooses one conflicting account over another the enterprise should not
continue. To do otherwise is to participate in illegitimate mythmaking.158
If the historically conscious interpreter applies either the ‘choose consensus
history when there is conflict’ approach or the ‘choose conflicting history when there
is conflict’ approach to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, he or she must conclude
its jurisprudential scope is quite limited. For instance, to historically venture into the
sphere of unenumerated “privileges or immunities,” such as economic liberties or
natural rights, is perilous seeing that there is no historical consensus as to what, if
any, rights are included. To state this point in different terms, to historically
pronounce that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was generally understood to
protect a series of economic or natural rights is to partake in judicial mythmaking
because the interpreter must build one conflicting historical account on another.159
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CHARLES, supra note 1, at 116.
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Id.
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Id. at 116-18.
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Boyce has aptly summarized this objectivity dilemma in the constraints of originalist
theory, writing:
If the [Fourteenth Amendment’s] framing generation had no common understanding
of Section One, it is hardly surprising that a century and a half later there is no
consensus among scholars as to its original meaning. Indeed, the quest for a single
“original meaning” is a misguided one. The diversity of original understandings
presents intractable difficulties that cannot be overcome by the fiction of a single
original “objective” meaning that a hypothetical “reasonable observer” would attribute
to the text. We are forced to inquire: What are the political and ideological
commitments of that reasonable observer? In what contexts does the observer situate
the text? What is the observer’s understanding of existing constitutional and legal
norms? There is no neutral or objective way of answering these questions. Any
attempt to reduce the multiplicity of possible original understandings to a single
original meaning is a distortion and ultimately a falsification of history.
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A different legitimacy problem presents itself as to the manner in which the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights to the States. Although there
is an historical consensus that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporated the
Bill of Rights, there remains scholarly disagreement about the historical era in which
those rights should be examined. A number of legal scholars have claimed that a
legitimate interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause requires an 1868
understanding or application of the Bill of Rights, not the 1791 understanding of the
founding generation.160 To be clear, there is a contingent of scholars that perceive the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment as a second founding moment.161 To them,
the Fourteenth Amendment not only defines the rules pertaining to national
citizenship and apportionment, but also ipso facto updates the Bill of Rights from
any 1791 understanding to 1868.162
This approach to constitutional interpretation may seem well and good to the
historically uninformed, but it directly conflicts with what the drafters of the
Fourteenth Amendment outright stated in debates and speeches. For one, the
aforementioned statements of Reconstruction Republicans concerning the
Declaration of Independence and its relationship to the Fourteenth Amendment
undermine such an historical theory.163 At no point did any Republican assert that
the Fourteenth Amendment updated the Bill of Rights. To quote, once again, from
Pennsylvania Representative Stevens, the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
was ensure the Constitution was based “on the principles of [the Declaration of
Independence] . . . for [then] every human being would have [his or her] rights,
every human being would have been equal before the law[.]”164 Thus, to Stevens, the
Fourteenth Amendment was not about updating the scope of constitutional
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provisions, but about accomplishing what the founding generation could not—a
Constitution based on true equitable principles.165
In 1871, Ohio Representative and Republican, William Lawrence articulated a
similar view of the Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose, stating, “[I]t must be clear
that [it] creates no new right, confers no new privilege, but is declaratory of what is
already the constitutional rights of every citizen in every State, that equality of civil
rights is the fundamental rule that pervades the Constitution and controls all State
authority.”166 Then there are a number of statements by Ohio Representative and
Republican John Bingham, the chief architect of the Fourteenth Amendment.167 On
August 26, 1867, in a speech defending the Fourteenth Amendment against
Democrat assaults, Bingham outlined what the Republicans hoped to accomplish—a
revival of 1776. “How would [the] pretense of [Democrats] have sounded in 1776,”
queried Bingham, “when those grand old men assembled in the convention at
Philadelphia and issued that new evangel to the nations in which they declared that
‘all men are created equal, and endowed by their Creator with the rights of life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”168 To Bingham and other Republicans, the
drafters of the Constitution steered away from these original principles when they
compromised over slavery. It was an error Bingham hoped to correct, as well as the
notion that state sovereignty was superior or equal to federal sovereignty.169
Bingham went so far as to criticize those Democrats that would deny the restoration
of the framers’ Constitution:
These gentlemen say they are for the Constitution, the great Constitution
which our fathers gave us. Let them read in the forefront of that
instrument, those words that should be written this day upon the lintels of
ever door in the land: “We the people of the United States, in order to
165

Id. at 74 (statement of Representative Thaddeus Stevens) (“When the great and good
men promulgated [the Declaration], and pledged their lives and sacred honors to defend it, it
was supposed to form an epoch in civil government . . . . Our fathers repudiated the whole
doctrine of the legal superiority of family or races, and proclaimed the equality of men before
the law. Upon that they created a revolution and built and Republic. They were prevented by
slavery from perfected the superstructure whose foundation they had thus broadly laid. For the
sake of the Union they consented to wait, but never relinquished the idea of its final
completion. The time to which they looked forward with anxiety has come. It is our duty to
complete their work.”).
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Richard L. Aynes, The Continuing Importance of Congressman John A. Bingham and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 589, 591 (2003) (“Bingham’s inseparable link
with the Amendment makes him worthy of attention from both a legal and an historical view .
. . his words may provide meaning or context for what has been termed original intent,
meaning or understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Richard L. Aynes, On
Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 103 (1993)
(discussing the importance of Bingham’s views on contemporaries and the first federal courts
to apply the Fourteenth Amendment).
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See, e.g., THE CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, Aug. 12, 1868, at 1, col. 3 (statement of
John Bingham) (the Fourteenth Amendment would “forever end the question of the
sovereignty of a State being supreme over the sovereignty of the nation, and of the asserted
right of State secession and of the right of any State to repeal the laws and the Constitution.”).
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establish justice, do ordain this Constitution,” etc. I am for the
Constitution, too; and equal political rights amongst all natural born
citizens, in every station of life, is simple justice. Therefore I am for it,
and in standing for it I but imitate the great majority of the people, who, in
1787, formed the Constitution of the Government, and handed it down to
us as a nation.170
Three days later, in a speech delivered before the people of Cincinnati, Ohio,
Bingham restated this proposition. The Fourteenth Amendment extended the
“imperishable words of the Declaration [of Independence]” to the States, but did not
alter the power of State and local governments to govern as the Constitution
intended.171 “Let no man for a moment suppose that I, or the party with which I have
to honor to act (could find source- is it which I have the honor to act?), desire to
impair or change that admirable structure of general and local, national and State
government, which was framed by those great fathers of the Republic,” stated
Bingham.172 Two years later, after the Amendment’s ratification, Bingham once
again described the Fourteenth Amendment in such terms, stating the Amendment
was ratified so that the “original and declared purpose of the Constitution shall be
carried into effect, lest justice shall be established in the land—the justice which
secures to every man his due—lest liberty to all shall be secured under the shelter
and sanction of American law . . . .”173
Still, despite the lack of historical evidence showing the Fourteenth Amendment
was intended to update the meaning and scope of the 1787 Constitution or the 1791
Bill of Rights, a number of scholars insist otherwise. Take for instance University of
Illinois law professor Kurt T. Lash, who writes: “[The Reconstruction] shift in the
public understanding of individual liberty suggests that what we are after is not the
incorporation of 1787 texts, but the public understanding of 1868 texts—in particular
the meaning of Privileges or Immunities and the scope of congressional power to
enforce these newly constitutionalized rights.”174 Then there is Columbia University
law professor Jamal Greene, who argues, “There is little reason, in principle, for an
originalist to privilege the meaning of an incorporated right circa 1791 over its
meaning in any other year prior to 1868.”175 Although Greene acknowledges there is
an argument to be made that the 1791 understanding matters, he finds it to be an
implausible interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.176
From a theoretical perspective there is an argument to be made that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause ipso facto updated the Bill of Rights from 1791 to 1868.177 If
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See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 29, at 267-68 (arguing the Privileges or Immunities Clause
automatically updated the “original meaning” of the Second Amendment from 1791 to 1868).
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history in context matters, though, if it truly matters, claims like Lash’s and Greene’s
must be cast out as contradicting the wishes of those who debated and ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment. Even if one applies ad hoc originalist methodologies—
whether it is original intent, original meaning, public understanding or some
combination of all three—one will be hard pressed to conclude that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause updated the Bill of Rights. Certainly one could quote historical
texts or statements by the ratifiers out of context, such as a speech by Massachusetts
Senator Charles Sumner proclaiming, “Every constitution embodies the principles of
its Framers,”178 and therefore conclude that Sumner believed the Reconstruction
Amendments updated the entire Constitution according to 1868 terms. This line of
argument, however, is nonsensical after reading Sumner’s next sentence, where he
declared, “we cannot err if we turn to the framers; and their authority increases in
proportion to the evidence which they have left on the question.”179
The writings of constitutional commentators contemporaneous with the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment do not support Lash’s and Greene’s
approaches to interpreting the Bill of Rights circa 1868 either. Take, for example, the
work of Timothy Farrar, a former judge of the New Hampshire Court of Common
Pleas, president of the New England Historical and Genealogical Society, 180 and the
author of a treatise titled Manual of the Constitution of the United States of
America.181 Concerning the application of the Bill of Rights to the States, Farrar
viewed Barron v. Baltimore as being wrongly decided and felt that the Bill of
Rights’ first eight amendments applied to the States.182 More importantly, like
Bingham, Farrar did not perceive the Privileges or Immunities Clause as updating
the Bill of Rights:
In respect to the powers of the government, it is of the same general
character as the last. It re-affirms some pre-existing power, but adds no
new ones . . . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of the United States . . . . This will
scarcely be claimed by anybody to delegate any thing new to the
government, or to prohibit the States from doing any thing which
otherwise they might rightfully do . . . . Thus, it will appear, by a minute
analysis of the fourteenth Amendment, that it contains no augmentation of
the powers of the [State or federal] government.183
The underlying point here is not to disparage the history surrounding the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, the incorporation of the Bill of Rights or the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead it is to illustrate the limits of
history in law, the ease in which the evidentiary record can be abused or misapplied,
178
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and the interpretational consequences that may result from engaging in historical
mythmaking. It is no secret that the practice of history in law is often portrayed as a
legitimate means to preserve the Constitution’s integrity and purpose, yet with just a
minor misstep one enters into the foray of illegitimate mythmaking. This does not
mean that applying historical myth to constitutional interpretation is always an
illegitimate enterprise. As was seen with the example of the Declaration of
Independence, its reference that “all men are created equal” not only took on a
different meaning from the mid to the late nineteenth century, but this meaning was
crucial to the drafting and ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments.
The acceptance of historical myth as a jurisprudential foundation is also
legitimate where correcting it would have severe consequences. This was seen in the
example of a reinvigorated Privileges or Immunities Clause. For one, to reboot over
a century of constitutional jurisprudence would have severe consequences on a
number of levels. Furthermore, because there is historical disagreement as to what, if
any, unenumerated rights were understood to fall within the “privileges or
immunities of the citizens of the United States,” a fully reinvigorated Privileges or
Immunities Clause would end up facilitating historical mythmaking more so than
restoring our past. Lastly, it would be redundant to reinvigorate the Privileges or
Immunities Clause given that our constitutional jurisprudence already provides a
method of incorporating both enumerated and unenumerated rights through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Still, there is a compromise worth considering as the jurisprudence of
incorporated rights moves forward. When the Supreme Court is again faced with the
question of whether to incorporate an enumerated right within the Bill of Rights—
such as the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury, the Seventh Amendment right to
a jury in civil trials or the Eight Amendment right against excessive bails and fines—
it could do so through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, albeit with a caveat. This
caveat being the restoration of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is merely to right
the historical wrong in The Slaughterhouse Cases—nothing more, nothing less. This
would restore the history of the Fourteenth Amendment to its proper place. In doing
so, however, it should be acknowledged that the drafters, framers, and ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment were not ipso facto updating the respective 1791 right to
1868 terms. They were for all intents and purposes correcting the defects of the
framers’ Constitution.
III. CONCLUSION
Generally speaking, it is common for members of the legal profession to view the
practice of history in law as not all that difficult of a task.184 It is a view that Justice
Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner recently espoused in the book Reading Law.185 To
Scalia and Garner, although the use of historical evidence to adjudicate legal
questions may not “always provide an easy answer, or even a clear one,” it is the
best interpretational approach available.186 Here, though, what Scalia and Garner
classify as history is actually originalism. The two are not one and the same. An
184
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originalist inquiry is, for the most part, a textually focused examination on “legal
meaning” at the time of a law’s drafting, enactment or ratification. In contrast, an
historical inquiry is contextually focused or about finding as many objective truths as
possible to recreate the past as a whole.
What truly separates an historical inquiry, however, from an originalist inquiry is
the degree by which myth consumes fact. Certainly, regardless of whether one is
performing an historical or originalist inquiry, the methodological process takes part
in generating myth.187 In terms of where the respective inquiries are to be placed on
the spectrum of constitutional mythmaking, however, the standard historical inquiry
is far less likely to engage in the process than its originalist counterpart. This is
mainly because originalism is not so much about reasoning from known historical
truths, but instead about recreating a hypothetical expected legal application of how
a hypothetical reasonable interpreter understood legal text at a particular point in
time. It does not help matters when originalists ignore how one legal text or doctrine
connects intimately with others. One cannot take those portions of a legal past he or
she agrees with, discard the others, and proclaim constitutional objectivity and,
therefore, constitutional legitimacy.
This is not to say that there are not instances where to legally reason from
historical myth is constitutionally legitimate. As was outlined in Part II, there are a
number of instances where a law or constitutional provision was enacted or ratified
with a false historical narrative in mind. In such cases there is nothing wrong with
relying on a mythical construct of the past when legally reasoning. Still, the
interpreter should proceed cautiously because even in these instances the mythical
construct has historical limitations.
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